Plum Island, June 4, 2006 (Long post)

[kattenbo]

Incident off Plum Island:

Intro:

Here's a write up of the incident off the tip of Plum Island, MA on June 4, 2006 that resulting in the USCG having to pull two of us out of the water. Trust me when I tell you this is not how you want to get your 15 minutes of fame. What we thought was a local incident has become amazingly well (even nationally) known - clearly anytime you end up dangling from a USCG helicopter you are subject to a lot of discussion. The purpose of this report is to describe as objectively as I can what happened, what worked and what didn't. The goal is to share our experience so others might pick up a hint or two and in turn to get input from you so we will have more options in our gear bag in the future.

The report starts with a 3 paragraph summary of the event, followed by a much longer detailed description. I've drawn on our own experience, a log of the incident generously provided by the USCG (PA3 Downs of Sector 1), as well as some conversations with others involved. The detailed description is followed by a series of specific lessons learned and supplementary comments - you can read the summary and jump straight to the comments if you prefer. There is a quick last thought to summarize. John has added a couple of specific comments (marked with "JOHN:") and I've asked Ken Fink, a well known, experienced kayaker and oceanographer who regularly presents on wind and waves to comment as well ("KEN:").

First and last, we want to thank the USCG Sector Boston and the crews from Station Merrimac, Station Gloucester, the crew from Air Station Cape Cod, as well as the Ipswich Harbor master who combined to pull us out of the box we were in. They showed skill, professionalism and courtesy and we are both extremely appreciative of their efforts.

Keith

Synopsis:

We launched from Pavilion Beach, between Great Neck and Little Neck in Ipswich prior to 10am on Sunday, June 4. Predicted conditions were for 12-15kt NNE winds and 4-5 ft waves. Water temperature was between 52 and 53 degrees. Tide tables showed high tide at about 6:11am, low tide at 12:17pm. The area we planned to paddle in was not far our the mouth of the Parker River estuary, in the bar area at the SE end of the Plum Island barrier island.

Between 20 to 30 minutes into the paddle and in the bar area we separately got knocked over and rolled. Conditions appeared rougher than predicted with steeper and crossing confused breaking/dumping waves, so we started to exit. I then got knocked over again, wasn't able to roll, exited my boat, then wasn't able to hold onto it. Almost immediately after my exit and as I was losing my boat, John was looped, then got hit again as his boat surfaced and had to exit but was able to hold on. I was able to reach him (very short distance) and we both held onto his boat. We spent the next 30 to 40 minutes attempting various self rescues - both trying to re-enter the boat and trying to swim or surf the boat out. At the end of that time as far as we could tell we had made absolutely no progress and appeared to be in the same spot we started.

At that point we called for assistance, indicating difficulty but not immediate danger. The USCG reacted to our first call and we spent the next two hours working on maintaining contact with John's boat, periodic attempts to reenter or swim it out and working with the USCG and the Ipswich Harbor master to assist them in locating and helping us. Slightly more than two hours after our initial call (a little more the 2.5 hours in the water), we were pulled out by a USCG helicopter which took us to a local airport. Per protocol we were taken to the local hospital, where oral temperatures were taken (John was 97.2, I was 95) and we refused treatment. John was bruised, I had a small rope burn on my left hand from the deck lines and we were both sore, but other than that fine. Thanks to the Ipswich Harbor master we recovered both boats the same day.

Detailed description (long):

John and I launched from Pavilion Beach, between Great Neck and Little Neck in Ipswich prior to 10am on Sunday, June 4. Predicted conditions

for the area from http://www.weather.gov/forecasts/graphical...ineDay.php#tabs were for 12-15kt NNE winds and waves of 4-5 ft. These predicted conditions matched conditions in which we had paddled in these waters in the past, and the winds were less than what we had been out in earlier in the season. High tide had been at 6:01am at Boston, with a +10 minute offset for our location. The tide was 8.8 feet, at the

low end of the range for the area, but we'd had considerable ran for the prior week. Water temp was between 52 and 53 degrees.

We were in our standard paddling clothing for this season, which meant fleece, dry suits, booties, PFDs. John had expedition fleece pants, a

polypropylene tee shirt and heavy weight fleece top. I had similar pants, a long sleeved poly rash guard and a mid weight top. We both pulled fuzzy rubber hoods with chin straps on under our hats as soon as we were on the water. I was paddling a Valley Qajariaq, relatively new to me (had it about two months, had been on the water with it probably 7 times including higher winds but smaller (3-4 ft) waves). Up until I got the Q-boat I had paddled a Romany Explorer. John was paddling his usual boat, a Valley Anas Acuta with an ocean (small round) cockpit. We both use homemade western red cedar Greenland paddles. We were carrying our year round kit including radios, flares, paddle floats, pumps, spare paddles, tows, etc. My spare was a full length carried on my fore deck, John had a short paddle as a spare, also on his front deck. That day I was carrying my radio, rescue kit (flares, mirror, light, whistle, knife), tow and fuzzy rubber hood in a new over vest - which turned out to be a good thing. I had a 3mm hood and mittens as well as water bladder in my skirt pocket. John's flare gun and other gear was on his life vest, but his radio was in a dry bag in his day hatch.

We paddled the short distance (about 1NM) out the mouth of the Parker River estuary, past the SE tip of Plum Island and headed towards the bar area with the intent of working the edges of the incoming breaks. This is an area we had paddled in the past, but not this year. We had been in the area for around ten minutes working the waves when during one of my frequent visual sweeps of the area I wasn't able to spot John who had been to my left rear a short (50 feet?) distance away. I turned the boat to look for him and spotted him shortly after - he had clearly been knocked over and rolled up, losing his hat (not hood) in the process. A very short time later I got knocked over, but was able to roll up. At this point we were further into the break area than originally planned and were dealing with confused, crossing and breaking seas. We apparently both made near simultaneous decisions that it was time to exit the area.

It's difficult to estimate wave height from the water. Here are the best data points I have: The Stellwagen buoy (Station 44029) recorded significant wave heights at it's location as between 7 and 8 feet during that time. John is very comfortable with an estimate of 8 feet plus for the large sets based on steepness, amount of boat on the face of the wave, depth of water where breaking and other visual clues. In a later conversation with the Ipswich Harbor master he characterized the wave height in the area as "all of five feet". I'm trying to reach the crews of the MLB's for their estimates and will post them when I get them.

As I turned and started to exit I got knocked over again by a crossing wave from my right. I attempted to roll up (offside sweep) and got hit again as I cleared the surface. I made a second attempt and blew the roll (lifted my head first) - in both cases I was only able to get a short breath before going back under the surface. I made a third attempt with what felt like good form, but again was hammered as I came up. At this point I was out of air and wet exited. I initially had one hand holding the cockpit and the other on my paddle. The next wave took the boat out of my hand but I was able to grab the rear toggle, which only allowed a one hand grip. The very next breaker broke that grip and my boat took off with the wave and was gone. While I don't consciously recall trying for a deck line (grabbing what I could), they were new, tight and would have been a challenge to get.

John was inshore from my position, to my left as I faced the shore and maybe 20 feet away, bow facing me and the waves. As I was unsuccessfully trying to hang on to my boat I saw him get what can only be described as trashed. The last sight of him in his boat was with the boat vertical and the hull exposed back to the cockpit about to get endo'd. He did get knocked over backward and his report is that as he surfaced (upside down but still in his boat) and got about a 1/4 breath he got hit again and pushed deep into the water - he exited and cleared some water from his lungs, holding onto his boat. I saw a piece of broken paddle in the water later on, so he really got hit.

JOHN: My first capsize was in the larger break zone that later capsized Keith for the second time. I came up on my second try after getting my bearings and a short breath on the first attempt. My recollection is that my boat which is generally very easy to roll was very difficult to roll in the turbulence. Immediately after rolling up I started back paddling and surfing waves away from the outside, larger break. I was doing this in reverse so I could maintain visual contact with Keith. The nature of the break 100 feet into shallower water was significantly diminished and although the seas were still powerful and confused they were much more manageable. I lost sight of Keith for a while which must have been when he capsized the first time because shortly he appeared again as he was setting up to head down a very large wave. Again I lost sight of him for an instant before seeing him in the water next to his boat. I then moved back in

to the larger break toward Keith but in those conditions I didn't have a good rescue plan. I was very concerned about the potential for being hit by his boat if my position became down wave of him and was equally concerned that I not end up up wave of him for the same reasons. Towing seemed risky at best. My dilemma was short lived because the next wave in put me in the water as well and also separated Keith from his boat. Everything that was going wrong instantly became worse as I heard Keith yell that he had lost his boat. END COMMENT

I used my paddle to backstroke in his last known direction and after the next wave passed I saw him out of his boat but hanging onto a deck line in the trough - I was able to get to him and grabbed another deck line. I had moved probably 20 feet to get to him. We figure that it was somewhere between 10:20am and 10:30am.

With both of us holding onto his boat, we collected our breath, difficult as we were regularly getting dumped on by breaking waves, checked each others condition and comfort and did a quick inventory. We were both ok, warm and coherent. I had my long paddle and John had his short, we had all the gear in our vests and my skirt pocket, including flares and my radio (John's was in a dry bag in his day hatch). We didn't have pump or paddle float (mine left with my boat, his when he got endo'd). This quickly changed as a wave started to separate me from the boat, I grabbed with my paddle hand and was able to hold onto the boat, but lost the long paddle.

The next 30 to 40 minutes were spent attempting to self rescue. We knew we should be just off the shallow bar that runs out from the end of Plum Island. We made several attempts to get John back into his boat using different techniques including cowboy reentry - trying for speed, but not fast enough, and the standard face down on the back deck reentry, both with me in the water trying to stabilize the boat. We also tried using the short paddle as an outrigger with me stabilizing the boat and the paddle. In each case we were not able to finish off the reentry before getting hit again and capsizing. We then tried swimming the boat in, again using a variety of methods including trying to side surf it in, lining up with the waves to move that way and just slogging along with it. Every once in a while we'd put our feet down to make sure we weren't struggling in water that was only up to our waist. At the end of that time as far as we could tell from landmarks we could see, we had made no progress. We estimated we were on the sea side of the bar, more than 0.5 NM from Crane Beach and a little closer (still about 0.5NM) to the spit end of Plum Island.

At this point we decided we were in a box we could not get out of without assistance. I called on Channel 16, using Pan, Pan, Pan to indicate we were in distress but not imminent danger. We reported two kayakers in the water, that we were in dry suits and PFDs, had radios and flares and one boat. The USCG log showed that Sector Boston received the call at 1100am local time. They requested our position which we stated as off the south point of Plum Island and off Crane Beach. The USCG log describes the communications as "very weak and garbled, mentions having flares, position unsure due to comms". Part of the garble was undoubtedly because virtually every time we tried to communicate another breaker would hit and submerge us.

Sector Boston immediately (within 3 minutes) requested Station Merrimack and Station Gloucester to respond. Both stations launched 25 ft rigid inflatables about 10 minutes after they got the call, but according to the log neither were able to exit their locations due to conditions at the Merrimack and the north mouth of the Anisquam. Both stations then launched 47 ft Motorized Life Boats (MLBs) - this was at 11:30 am or about 30 minutes after our first call. At about this time the Ipswich Harbor master was also on the water, but was unable to get out of the mouth of the Parker River. Sector Boston had also requested helicopter assistance "due to poor comms and uncertain position" - this request was made 10 minutes after our first call and before the initial 25 ft rigid inflatables reported they were unable to respond.

During all of this activity, John and I continued to attempt to hold on the boat, to swim the boat out and to stay in intermittent contact with the USCG on Channel 16. They may have requested us to change channels, but if so we didn't hear them and it wasn't logged. One thing we asked was for them to inform us when they were close enough for us to launch a flare, figuring flares were helpful only if someone was around to see them. We also tried to describe our location using local landmarks (tip of the island and a prominent cut in the tree line associated with Crane's Castle) and the Ipswich Habor master was able to use those to give a better idea of where we were.

We got the first request for a flare at 11:35 am and John fired off his pistol flare. The Ipswich Harbor master used this to more accurately identify our position as between the buoy #2 and the south tip of Plum Island on the seaward side. This position was refined in the log about 15 minutes later to 42-42.27N, 070-45.74W which plots on that line. I believe the refined position was an estimate based on his positioning us on that line and an estimated distance from shore. Charted, this would put us about 0.4NM from the tip of the island and about 1.0NM from Crane Beach.

The Station Gloucester MLB arrived first, at Buoy #2 at 11:55am, reported starting search and that they were making callouts asking us to send up added flares. We probably missed the first few calls (submerged some of the time, radio volume control getting knocked around, etc.) We finally did hear them and I started using my pencil flare launcher. John had brought three shells for his pistol, but had been unable to refasten the fast clip strap holding the pocket on his vest closed (hard to do with one hand holding the gun, one the boat and getting dumped on) and lost the other two. I had a total of 8 mini flares in a flat pack with the launcher tethered to it. I looped the tether through a D ring on my over vest - a good thing as the kit was occasionally pulled from my hand.

Both MLBs were in the area just after 12noon (we had been in the water a bit more than 1.5 hours at this point). They reported spotting the flares and us at 12:05 and updated our position to approximately 150 yards from the bow of an MLB which was at 42-42.712N, 070.45.165W. This placed us a bit less than 0.8NM from Plum Is and 1.4NM from Cranes, or about 0.4NM further out to sea. From our position we could hear the MLBs maneuvering, but couldn't immediately spot them and were not aware that they had spotted us. I continued to fire flares periodically (seven in total, all worked) until we were able to hear them tell us they had us in sight. Because of the water depths and sea state, the MLBs (47 ft craft) could not get in to us (this was explained to us later) - when we could see them they were rocking and rolling. I asked several times if there was something we could be doing to help with our rescue and was told the stay with the boat and conserve energy.

During this period we continued to focus on staying with the boat and not being taken by surprise by the waves - which continued to break over us. We were periodically able to get partially out of the water and maintain balance, but would then get trashed again (more than once rolling the boat, with us hanging on, completely over). Communication continued to be interrupted by badly timed wave breaks. During the period I was pulled away from the boat once but was able to lunge to get back. The same thing happened to John once - these were probably to two moments of highest tension. We did make occasional attempts in momentary calm periods to move the boat in the direction of shore, but would quickly start getting hit again.

Not quite 2 hours into the event the Ni-Cd power pack in my radio drained. We were able to get John's radio out of the day hatch and resume communications with the USCG.

The helicopter arrived on scene at between 12:48pm and 12:54pm (there is a conflict in the log file on the time), after its launch was delayed (launched at 12:04pm) due to equipment issues. It quickly made visual contact. I had started to feel the chill what felt like about 15 minutes before that (after about 2 hours in the water) and had been briefly nauseated (lying on the sharp upturned hull of an Anas Acuta and getting maytagged would do that to you - no lasting effect). The helicopter put a swimmer in the water who checked our condition and then had a rescue basket brought down - I was taken up first and then John. We were reported on board of the helicopter at 1:06pm - so about 2:30 to 2:40 hours in the water.

We were taken to the local airfield in Newburyport (our home town). We were able to walk out of the helicopter and to the ambulance, which by protocol took us to the hospital in town. We refused medical attention - not needed. They did take oral temperatures - John was at 97.2 and I was at 95. I live just down the street from the hospital, so we walked there and John called his wife. After he left I took a warm shower and had some soup to warm up, then got a call from the USCG saying the Ipswich Harbor Master had my boat. My wife and I and John and his wife drove down to our launch point to pick up John's car and my boat which was left about 1/4 mile away. John's wife took his first car home, my wife took my boat home and John and I walked Crane Beach looking for his (we didn't know where the Harbor Master found mine). No luck, but John did get his back later that night. We later learned that both boats were found on the inside of the bar, in the mouth of the Parker River.

Supplemental Comments/Lessons Learned:

Our experience level:

John has been paddling for about 15 years, most of that year round, including day and multi day paddles. I've been paddling about 10 years, year round most of that time, day paddles. We both have been using Greenland paddles for the last five years. I had done very limited paddling for 2005 due to work conflicts, but had been on the water almost every weekend since January of this year. John had some injuries (not paddling related) that had reduced his paddling time in 2005, but was over it and had also been back on the water regularly since January. We both had trained, had been certified ACA open water instructors (had let our certifications lapse), and had done some instructing. We tend to roll a couple of times on every trip to keep our hand in. We had been out in a variety of conditions this year, including higher winds (20kts - 25kts) and moderate (2ft - 4ft) waves. I think we consider ourselves fairly conservative paddlers, trying to gauge conditions and have fun in water with "texture" without terrifying ourselves or others. We always gear up, especially in fall, winter and spring. John's more of the outdoors person, and earlier in his life had spent 18 months as the stores keeper at South Pole Station. Lesson learned: It appears that my skills may not have come back as much as I thought, particularly offside rolling/sculling. Despite rolling in pool sessions and on water, including a couple in conditions prior to this trip, I absolutely blew at least one of my last three trys. Of the four roll opportunities on this trip, that's a 75% rate for form - clearly not good enough.

Decision to launch:

The conditions when we launched were not obviously extreme. The winds were moderate (12-15kts) and lower than we had paddled in this year. The waves were projected to be at the higher end of our range, but not outrageous. The visual from shore showed breakers as expected. We were familiar with the area from paddles in prior years, and had previously been out in this area in conditions with higher predicted waves (though in a larger group). We dressed appropriately, had a full compliment of gear, felt rested, and had family who knew where we were. While we expected to be challenged, we felt that this was more a good opportunity to rebuild some skills. I was in a relatively new boat to me, a hard chine boat compared to my usual Explorer, but one of the goals was to gain additional experience in that boat in heavier, but not extreme conditions. In retrospect, changing two variables at the same time (next step up in conditions, less familiar boat) probably contributed to my being knocked over.

Self rescue attempts:

Re-entering an ocean cockpit boat in steep breaking and crossing seas is a bit of a challenge, especially if you have lost the paddle float. I attempted to stabilize the boat for John by hanging off the deck lines on the up wave side, holding across the back deck and at John's suggestion rigging his short paddle as an outrigger under his rear deck lines and balancing that, without success. A possible issue here is that since we both have not come out of our boats involuntarily in years our paddle float (and similar) reentry skills may have degraded. We'll be adding these to our routine rescue practice going forward.

Having a paddle float on the end of that outrigger could have provided sufficient additional stability, along with having a human holding the boat, to allow the re-entry to succeed. While the paddle float on John's boat was on his back deck under two tight bungees and had ridden through rough conditions, it's proof that past history is not a predictor of future performance. The clear lesson of this event is if it's not tethered, it's gone. More on tethers later.

The obvious self rescue solution with probably the highest chance of success simply did not occur to us until we were on shore, a bit warmed up and reviewing the event as we looked for John's boat. Given time to collect enough air and with an extra person to help, a re-entry and roll would most likely have worked to get John upright. It may not have gotten us out - we were still in original conditions that had knocked us both over, he would have had the extra weight of me to deal with (could have helped), and only the short paddle to move the boat making bracing harder, but it was an opportunity we didn't think of at the time. We are both aware of the technique, have practiced it on occasion, and have recommended it to others, but it just went away on that day in those circumstances. Lesson learned - keep techniques at the top of mind by periodically reviewing "what would I do if". It's not enough to know a technique, you also have to remember to use it in interesting circumstances - having mentally run through a variety of strategies before launching helps that.

KEN: Keith - some speculation on what you would have done had you been successful in getting John back into his boat. He would have been in his (flooded) boat and you would still have been in the water without a boat. For him to tow you back to shore on an Anas Acuta while you were lying on the back deck would have been a Herculean challenge and not likely successful. There will be times when you can forget about trying to get back into your boat when there are two of you and one boat. Clearly the early loss of your boat was a key event in forcing you to eventually seek outside assistance. Had John regained his boat, his best move likely would have been to get to shore and seek rescue assistance for you out there somewhere (end Ken comment).

Swimming the boat and fin envy:

Frankly looking for suggestions here. John describes himself as "not a world class swimmer". I don't swim frequently now, but in my younger days did some competitive swimming and used to swim for exercise when I could. I'm very at home in the water and consider myself a relatively strong swimmer. However, we could not make progress. We tried swimming with the boat lined up with our direction of travel, but didn't make progress. We tried placing the boat in a position to side surf the breakers - if we balanced on the hull (remember, two of us), we'd get rolled (only tried that one a couple of times - not fun). If we used to deck lines while in the water, the boat would start to go, we'd get a great jerk on our arms, seemingly move forward a bit and then come to a stop (can you say sea anchor?). After 30 to 40 minutes, we made no forward progress using any techniques. I suspect it was the combination of ebb current balancing waves forces, but I'll leave that to the likes of Ken Fink to explain. Any thoughts?

KEN: Remember that waves continue to break even when current is opposed to waves. The waves are higher than normal and often dumping (also termed plunging). This means you were likely being carried further out to sea by remnants of ebb currents while trying to use waves to push you in. In this case with your bodies in the water, the ebb currents will always trump the wave forces which are intermittent and most effective only on the water surface. Once the boats were free of your hold they were then pushed quickly toward the shore by waves picking them up and moving them shoreward. (end Ken comment (edited)).

Apparently the first thing John thought when he saw the USCG swimmer being lowered was "I gotta get me a pair of those fins". Having a pair of fins might have provided enough additional power to move the boat. I expect to see a pair on his back deck next time we're out - tethered of course.

Leaving the boat and swimming:

Would we have been better off in those conditions to have left the boat and tried to swim to shore? We talked about it on the water before we made the VHF call and while we were waiting for the USCG to arrive and made the deliberate decision to stay with the boat. We felt then and still feel now that it was a conservative decision under that particular set of circumstances. We were in a known state, we were together and we had a large, buoyant and visible object to work with. Our training had emphasized staying with the boat. If we gave up the boat and were not able to make shore, a not unreasonable thought, we would be two smaller objects, possibly separated in the water and therefore harder to find. It took both radios and both flare sets to get us out of there - if we had been separated, someone would have been short. And as John commented at one point we both had read numerous reports of people being picked up from their boats and of people not being picked up when separated from the boat. I now know that some friends have swum out of those waters after losing their boats - they had no choice - so it was possible. I don't know that on that day in those conditions if it would have been possible for us. I do know I'm still here (even if embarrassed). Having said that, the lesson learned is that part of our prep before going out again will be to talk about possible drift if we're out of the boats again - where would we go if we got in trouble.

I asked the Ipswich Harbor Master for his opinion on whether we should have tried to swim - his response was an immediate and emphatic "absolutely not". He felt that if we had tried and gotten into the area of the bar we would have been beaten up badly, and that there was a possibility we would not have made the bar that day. He was emphatic that staying was the correct decision. I'll be getting USCG participants views and will post once I have them.

Calling for help:

That was both hard and smart. It was hard because we are taught to get ourselves out of situations and to not rely on outside help - doing so is akin to admitting failure. Pride and peer pressure adds to this - at one point in the water the comment was "ya know, we're going to look like friggin idiots". We considered ourselves reasonably well skilled, conservative paddlers - it was frustrating to not be able to get out of what we were in. Reality was that we were not getting anywhere and we were in 52 degree water getting knocked around. The USCG and the Ipswich Harbor master reacted promptly and professionally, but even so it took another 2 hours before we were out of the water, at which point I was just beginning to slide down the chilly slope. If we had delayed the call further, assuming nothing else changed, I would have been in worse shape, a liability rather than a participant and at some point John would have begun to feel the effects. Our lesson here is to remember that rescue is not instantaneous - you need to leave a safety margin that accounts for the time delay between when you call and when you are out. I'm not sure what guidelines to provide for making that call, so suggestions are welcome.

KEN Comment: This is always and will remain a judgment call for anyone in a potential rescue situation. I think it is important to try as many self rescue procedures as possible, but you need to be able to admit defeat and call for a rescue before it is too late. (end Ken comment).

Knowing where help will come from:

When assessing conditions for a paddle one of the things I haven't done in the past that I will do in the future is assess not only local conditions for the paddle, but also for where help will likely come from if needed. Both Station Merrimac and Station Gloucester were not able to reach us with the 25 foot rigid hull inflatables we kinda expected to see (certainly didn't expect a helicopter) because of conditions at the mouth of the Merrimac and the mouth of the Anasquim. Also the Ipswich Harbormaster couldn't get out around the bar. This meant that not only were we in the water longer, but also that the craft that could get out of the rivers (47 foot MLBs) couldn't get into the shallow water we were in. They had to stand off and watch until the helicopter arrived on station, which was frustrating for them. Lesson learned: Spread the trip planning net a little further to assess where help will come from, how long it might take to reach you and the conditions they will need to pass through to get to you.

Radio - access and use:

I mentioned that I was wearing an over vest for the first time that day. Because of that I had shifted my submersible VHF radio to a special pocket on the vest which meant I had to take it out of the normal radio dry bag I carried it in (the one with the thumb pocket, etc). This turned out to be a very good thing. I would never have been able to manipulate the radio controls in that bag in those conditions. Having direct access to the volume, squelch and transmit controls was key. Try it yourself sometime.

The radios we had have two transmit power levels. Both radios were normally set on low to conserve battery. Given the length of the rescue, this was probably a good thing, but we were unaware that we were hard to hear - we assumed reports of garbled/breaking transmissions were due to submersion (of both radio and operator) not transmission strength. We probably would have kicked it up to high if we had known. By the way, radio communication is hard when you are frequently underwater. Be patient, ask for repeats.

Tethers - good and evil twins:

Tethers keep our gear with us. It was particularly key for my flare kit, which would have gone away if it had not been attached. The launcher was tethered to the flat pack of flares and when I got the kit out I looped it twice to the D ring on my vest by running the launcher through. The radios also had wrist tethers to keep them with us - important when that second hand was needed to hold on (frequently). Stuff we needed that wasn't tethered went away (paddle float). On the other hand, tethers tangle. I have a mirror, whistle, flashlight and flares on separate tethers in the same pocket. Once the pocket opened, they were all out and began to knot together.

Tow:

This is a special note. I carry a 50 ft tow rope daisy chained to about 20 feet in a waist belt and wide mouth pouch closed with Velcro. My practice has been to fasten the tow clip to a ring or loop on the front of my vest for fast access, leaving a couple of feet of rope running under my arm and back to the pouch. In these conditions, that tow rope was pulled out of the pouch and fully deployed in the water. For some reason I did not immediately release the rope and pouch. At different points for the next period of time (not short), it ended up looped on the boat (freed it), on one of my legs, and eventually caught in the tethers for the other gear. At that point I finally come to my senses and cut the rope free from the other tethers, released the clip and the pouch (release worked fine). DO NOT DO WHAT I DID. If your tow deploys and you can't immediately re bag it, get rid of it.

KEN Comment: I have always warned paddlers about lines on boats. My warning says if it is long enough to get around your neck, it likely will. I believe in paddle tethers, but on a short line running from paddle shaft to one wrist. This way it stays close to you but can be let go of when grabbing a boat, etc. Some paddlers go a step further and tether the paddle to boat as well, but this usually means a longer line for maneuverability. It is also likely that forces were such that the paddle might have been lost anyway, but at least you might have kept it for a while and it might have been useful. (end Ken comment).

Knife:

A small note: For some reason as I was transferring gear from my PFD to the over vest I thought about positioning my shorty sheath knife, not only on the vest, but in the sheath. It occurred to me that it would be good if when I grabbed it my thumb was on the back of the blade, not the front. Check it out, if you were to reach up and grab you knife right now, where would your thumb land? I made sure that with a right hand grab the blade was down - proved beneficial. It also proved beneficial to have the blunt tip version when cutting tethers and tows near the dry suit - I don't know that the blade ever touched the suit, but it helped my confidence in all the churn.

Deck lines - really really good - toggle, not sufficient:

Without the deck lines on John's boat we would not have been able to hang on. The Anas Acuta has almost full perimeter lines, with a gap on one side of the cockpit. They stood up to a lot of pressure and no brackets popped. John spent a fair amount of time with his feet in the cockpit and holding the line that ran beside it. I was on a side line. I found that I needed to slide up the line away from the bracket so when I got hit I had space to slide down the line instead of getting pulled free. I picked up a bit of rope burn, but a small price to pay. I was not able to hold onto the toggle for my boat in those conditions - the deck lines provided a much more secure grip.

Thought Processes/Mental State:

JOHN: I can only describe my mental state as "strangely calm". I knew we were in a bad spot with limited options for changing our position voluntarily but we were also warm and dry and we had a boat to cling to. We had drinking water both on Keith's vest and in my boat, we had communications gear and we had flares. So there was no immediate danger only longer term risk. After our futile attempts to paddle the boat out of the surf zone we reluctantly used the radios to call for help. This is not something we depend on using but in this case it was a strong backup alternative. We continue to debate whether we should have made an attempt to swim for shore but I'm still not comfortable with the odds for success with that option. It did not seem that the currents were behaving predictably that day so swimming would have been a high risk activity. I was so focused on staying with the boat that all else seemed secondary. It was very comforting, although perhaps falsely because we were still in danger, to be communicating with the Coast Guard. My ongoing concern was the amount of time we were in the water and the resulting cooling. I felt only very slightly chilled after two and one half hours in the water so THE major concern was neutralized, as long as we could get out of the water in time. I can only say that I had faith that we would get through the ordeal somehow, ultimately via the Coast Guard, thank you very very much! I'm sure we will be much more conservative in the future. I think the one question that I did not ask myself before events spun out of control was "what if I had to conduct a rescue in these conditions and what are its chances for success"? Had either of us done that we might have avoided this whole affair. Thanks to all who helped rescue us and those who called later to express their relief at our survival.

KEITH: My response to the several people who have asked "were you scared" was "I was busy" - cliche but true. I was focused on working with John to solve a variety of problems and performing tasks related to hanging on, communicating with each other and the community supporting us and checking options. We checked in with each other frequently (you ok, you warm), and did our best to warn of incoming breaks. I think the most uncomfortable time for breathing was not the frequent submersions (not fun, mind) but a period where we were engulfed in sea foam. The last hour with the MLBs standing off was the hardest, because I could see them, knew that for some reason they couldn't get to us, and wondered what the options were at that point. I sure they tried to tell us, but we didn't hear until finally (right after I lost breakfast) we heard that something was 5 to 10 minutes out - turned out to be the helicopter. Like John, I revisited the should we swim or stay decision, but was certain we would become separated and therefore harder to find and rescue, extending our immersion time - essentially complicating an already complicate scenario. Also like John I didn't feel in imminent danger, but was concerned about long term immersion - unlike John, I did begin to get chilled towards the end. The most tense moment was when I became momentarily separated from the John's boat. Mentally I've had a harder time after the event, heavily involved in the process of second guessing my decisions, but am mostly past that now. I'll be more cautious and certainly have several more factors to consider in planning trips. I join John in thanking the USCG, the Ipswich Harbor Master, and all the friends and well wishers who have reached out since the event.

Summary:

If I had to summarize the key take away it is that routinely maintaining a sensible level of preparedness for something unexpected to happen was critical to us coming out of this in as good shape as we did. Other than clothing we had the same stuff we take on every paddle, year round - it's just there. On any day bad things can happen and occasionally will. Good gear and good preparedness is not a substitute for good judgment, but even good judgment is occasionally overwhelmed by immediate events. So bring all three on every paddle.

Keith

Added info still being collected:

Coast Guard description of conditions

Coast Guard views on things we could have done better

Coast Guard view - should we have swum for it

[ayong]

I am immensely grateful for this thoughtful, comprehensive account.

You all--Keith and John and the rescuers--did a superb job out there, and it is wonderful that you choose to share your experiences with us.

Keep up the good work and thank you very much.

Tom

[jeffcasey]

Thank you for taking the considerable effort to thoroughly document this. It is a sobering read, and a valuable one. Glad you are all well.

[bob budd]

And what became of your hat?

[djlewis]

You used all three of those emergency tools that we are fond of saying we have never deployed in combat for personal survival, nor even heard first-hand of others using that way. Well, I guess that will never be the same! And you used them in exactly the way envisioned in our training.

It sounds like the radio was (or radios were) absolutely indispensable. Without them, you would never have come to the attention of the CG or Harbormaster, and your chances of survival considerably smaller, perhaps nil. Correct?

How important were the flares? Would you have been rescued at all without them? Or just more slowly?

How about the knife? If sounds like you avoided a significant hazard by use of the knife, but I was not certain from your narrative how crucial that was to your survival.

On top of it all, how many of us have been in the water long enough in our dry suits and other protective attire to start worrying about survival in the face of cold water? So there was really a fourth margin due to equipment that few if any of us have ever come close to exhasuting. And add to that the deck lines -- a fifth, but one we tend to take for granted.

Wow... talk about using all your margins!

I'm so so so glad you had all those things and the other tangible and intangible factors that enabled you to survive -- including your skills, generally sound judgement, and obvious will to make it!

And thank you for the amazing account, which will certainly change my paddling practices and, I suspect, those of many others.

--David.

[Bill Gwynn]

Thank you for the clear concise report of that days events. Relating your experiences, thoughts and feelings is so appreciated and of utmost value to the paddling community.

PS.edit: I have taken the liberty of posting a chart of the area (hope thats OK Keith) that includes the launch location and the rescue location (based on the coordinates in the report) for those that may not be familiar with the area. This chart is taken from "Blue Charts" and may not accurately reflect the changing sand bar locations and depths.

http://www.kayakpics.com/gallery/album70/rescue?full=1

[glad]

Thank you for your detailed story. I have been checking the NSPN site more than once a day anxiously awaiting your account. At first blush this is a very exciting read, an immersion in a true adventure.

But then, I realize, these are people that I know, doing things that we do and our human frailty overwhelms me.

Congradulations for keeping your cool and thank goodness you are safe.

Karen

[PeterB]

Thank you. Your post indeed "sets the standard" for after-action reports.

The wealth of information contained therein will benefit all of us, regardless of skill level and experience. Whether launching in calm waters or 4-6 foot seas, running tidal races or getting into a boat & wet-exiting for the first time, as a paddling community we all share the experience of encountering conditions which fecklessly wander along that outer edge of our own comfort zone, and I would wish for all of us to seek the common ground that may be found in your words.

[Nick Schade]

I want to thank Keith and John for putting together this report. It shows that prepared paddlers can still get in trouble and that some of those things you may carry but plan on never using may come in handy.

I have paddled in this same area after seeing forecasts similar to what Keith and John saw. However, I was much less prepared should anything go wrong. Luckily I came back after having a wonderful time. The conditions I experienced were not in fact as bad as what these two experienced, but that was just luck.

In hindsight it may be possible to say that this incident was entirely avoidable, but until you have actually experienced something, you may not recognize the signs.

There will be two kinds of people who will dismiss this incident as something they don't need to worry about. Some people will think they are too skilled, others will think they are too smart. Those in the "skilled" camp will think that they would not have failed at the roll or would have succeeded in some sort of re-entry. The "smart" camp will think they would have known better than to go out into such obviously dangerous conditions.

The "skilled" group need to understand that no matter how good they are, the ocean is always capable of being stronger than the best individual. Nobody's skills are infinite. At some point you may reach the limits of your abilities. Maybe not in these conditions, but sometimes you don't know what you will encounter.

the "smart" group is under the impression that they can identify all risks and easily avoid them. They think there skills are so far above the conditions that they choose to paddle that they will easily paddle around any trouble. It is a nice idea, but assumes perfection in their ability to predict the future.

If you read Keith's report and your reaction is "this would never happen to me" you are almost certainly correct. You will probably never get into the exact same pickle that these two experienced. But, if you think you are safe because you can either roll in 5' breaking waves or can easily avoid them, you miss the point. If you go out in conditions you think you can handle and your skills have never let you down, Keith and John were merely doing what you do and they got in trouble. Doing what you do everyday may put you in a position where you are over your head. Your planning needs to include plans for what you will do when your plans fail, and plans for when your failure plan fails...

[jonsprag1]

great post---just a couple of comments---I'm assuming the area where you got into trouble was a bar where wind was opposing the tide as it came across the bar? Could you tell me what the stage of the tide was when you flipped--I would guess it to be about mid tide when the strongest current is running creating the biggest waves. Finally regarding the Tilley Hat---if you sent in the card that comes with it when purchased they will send you another one free. At least that's the Company's brag.

[Lbeale]

I like Karen have been anxiously waiting for your trip report post--and it was worth the wait--I will keep re-reading this post because it has multiple messages about skills, not losing your head in a crisis and, what it really means to paddle with someone--thank you for a most informative post.

I also appreciate the time and effort it took to write this post. When I blew out my knee during leadership training last year, it was difficult for me to write about the experience for many reasons--having to relive the experience, feeling like an idiot, difficulty in articulating sequence of events, then reflection and, lessons learned--

Keith and John thank you for this written endeavor to share your experiences so that I can be a better paddler--Les

[Suz]

Keith,

Many thanks for posting your detailed report, getting Ken Fink's input and the coast guard info all gathered in one place. Perhaps David Lewis can post a picture of the location for those from other areas to better understand the location and the hazards faced. The time and effort you put into this really helps to better understand the situation.

I was out in the same place the day before you and John were there. Similar conditions and timing with the tide and no where near as prepared. One in the group had on swim trunks and a semi dry top, another neo pants and dry top, me in surfskin and dry top. No hoods and no ready access to flares. One radio was easily accessible, others in the day hatch. I was even in a new boat as you were. There seemed to be clear zones of conditions at the southern tip, 4-6', with occaisional 8', 6-8 with cccasional 10'sets. I stuck in the smaller area due to being in a new boat. I was pretty much on my own as the other two were out with the big waves. At the time I realized that if I came out of my boat, I would pretty much be on my own as the others were way too far away to help. It was clear that the current was moving pretty fast and at the time I was carefully watching the drift to avoid the confused area. We enjoyed a few hours of play from 10-1:30 and then headed back in and attended to our other committments.

On Sunday when were all at the MITA presentation and heard of the morning rescue, my first thought when I heard it was the two of you, was something must have gone wrong... some sort of medical emergency or something external caused the roll to fail, something "broke" to cause the boat to get away, something "else" had to have happened. What I see clearly from your report is that basically simple things can go wrong at the wrong time and then the cycle starts to unfold and can escalate pretty quickly.

Nick's words of wisdom should be heeded.

You can never be more skilled than the ocean or smarter than mother nature.

Easy to let your guard down when you pack your boat and put on your gear. Never needed my flares... so because they are expired, I didn't replace them. Never use my float bags so I bring them and keep them in the hatches but not inflated... they are there just in case. Never use my sea snips so after cleaning them last time, forget to put them back on the PFD...

Thanks Keith and John for taking the "class" and allowing us to learn the lesson the easy way.

Suz

[jonsprag1]

high tide that morning morning was 6:03am--low tide was 12:49pm--assuming the initial knock downs were around 10:20--10:30 that would have put the tide into the fourth hour of the ebb---still a pretty strong current.

[Adam Bolonsky]

Thanks much for the info, especially the info on radio usage and the transcript snippets from the CG log.

[EEL]

> What I see

>clearly from your report is that basically simple things can

>go wrong at the wrong time and then the cycle starts to

>unfold and can escalate pretty quickly.

>

When actively climbing I read accident reports religiously. The point often made was that accidents are usually the result of a series of minor, sometimes trivial, errors or failures which, often due to a set of circumstances, culminate into a major/catstrophic problem. Very sobering since all of us can remember trips where little things went wrong, but they remained just annoynaces.

Ed Lawson

[kattenbo]

That looks about right from my own charting - I think I has us a bit further out, but could have been off a bit.

Keith

[kattenbo]

David - I've interspersed responses to your questions...

>It sounds like the radio was (or radios were) absolutely

>indispensable. Without them, you would never have come to

>the attention of the CG or Harbormaster, and your chances of

>survival considerably smaller, perhaps nil. Correct?

Hard to say, but generally yes. There is nothing in the USCG log that I can read as indicating any calls from other people notifying the USCG of our situation. There were no other boaters on the water - one guy on a sailboard had gone out and come back in before we got into the breaks. While there were beach walkers when we were rescued, we didn't see anyone when we launched. I don't think anyone would have seen the flares if we only had them. Radio was key. We didn't start using the flares until we had specific knowledge, via the radio, that there was someone around to see them. This would have been more critical if we had fewer available (we ended up shooting 8).

>

>How important were the flares? Would you have been rescued

>at all without them? Or just more slowly?

I think we would have been rescued without them, but probably more slowly. The landmarks we gave allowed the Ipswich Harbor Master to get the USCG in the general area, but the flares were responsible for allowing him to narrow the area down and for the MLBs to gain first visual contact with us. Without them the helicopter probably would have spent a bit more time looking - recall that the helicopter was launched (according to the log) because of poor comms and uncertain position, before the USCG reported that conditions were such that the 25 ft RIW couldn't get out.

>

>How about the knife? If sounds like you avoided a

>significant hazard by use of the knife, but I was not

>certain from your narrative how crucial that was to your

>survival.

Hard to say what "might" have happened. It was absolutely critical to getting the tow free of the other gear tethers and therefore away from us - without the knife we would not have been able to untangle it. At the point I woke up and cut it free we were not personally entangled, but I was starting to have difficulting manipulating the flares becuase of it's being hung up on the rope.

>

>On top of it all, how many of us have been in the water long

>enough in our dry suits and other protective attire to start

>worrying about survival in the face of cold water? So there

>was really a fourth margin due to equipment that few if any

>of us have ever come close to exhasuting. And add to that

>the deck lines -- a fifth, but one we tend to take for

>granted.

I fully agree about not underselling deck lines. I proved to myself that at least I'm not able to hold onto a 18 ft flooded seakayak in a surf condition by a toggle, but I am able to hold onto a 17 ft boat in a similar condition by the deck lines. And they we're critical as we moved around the boat during our self rescue and swimming attempts.

[Gcosloy]

Very amazing and interesting report. If Groneth and Bose ever decide to do Deep Trouble II, your story would be in it. I'm so pleased you guys are both OK. I was wondering. Did the choice of a hard chined boat make things more difficult in the conditions you were in? In my limited experience, soft chines seem to be more forgiving in broaching seas. Also, while you did have almost everything in the way of equipment and years of experience going for you, would the addition of a pair of inflatable sea sponsons that could be quickly clipped to the boat allowed one of you to re-enter Johns boat? In the same vein that you wondered if swim flippers might be a future addition to your gear, I carry a pair in my day hatch.

Gene

[houdini]

Thanks for a very through report. Several questions come to mind. Your radio quit after two hours. Was this an equipment failure or did the radio battery not have a good charge? What brand radio was it? Was the second radio in a dry bag? Could you comment as to the wisdom of carrying gear on your person (or attached) versus stowing it. It strikes me that if you had lost the boat with the radio in stowage it may have impacted the outcome.

Would orange smoke have worked better than a flare? Can you think of a better way to retain the flares attached to the flare gun?

Sorry to pose so many questions but I believe there are many ways to learn from your experience. Thankfully you walked away which isn't always the case.

[Legend]

Thank you guys for the very thorough write up. It is amazing how quickly things can go wrong in that kind of environment. I was out there earlier that weekend in the exact spot where you guys ran into trouble and found the conditions to be very challenging. I have paddled the mouth of the Merrimack in much worse conditions and bigger seas but didn't feel quite as much out of control as I did that weekend that you guys were out there. The steepness of the waves combined with the short time between them and the reflecting waves make that a very dangerous place to paddle. I think that I will certainly be much more cautious about that particular spot in the future because of the way the waves build up there it creates much bigger conditions that what the bouys are reading. I know that the seas were supposed to be only 5 ft high, but I know for a fact that my 18 ft long boat was nearly vertical on several occasions and the height of the wave was a lot more than 5 ft high. It is strange how just outside the confused seas by that sand bar change to much bigger seas just 100 to 200 ft away. It is very difficult to get out of there once you get trapped in that outgoing tide. There have been more than a few very good paddlers challenged in that very spot, it is a good thing that you were so well prepared.

I really appreciate Nick's note on the whole subject, it is easy for us to think we could handle the conditions or wouldn't get out into them in the first place, but I am humbled by the situation and I was humbled by the conditions that I found out there that weekend.

[Paul Sylvester]

Great report!

Just one question....What was the frequency of the waves?

[djlewis]

Boston Buoy showed this at 10:50 AM on June 4

wind -- 19 kts

dominant wave

period -- 8 sec

height -- 7.5 ft

wind wave

period -- 6 sec

height -- 6.6 ft

wave swell

period -- 8 sec

height -- 4.9 ft

[EEL]

>Radio - access and use:

>

>The radios we had have two transmit power levels. Both

>radios were normally set on low to conserve battery.

There are valid reasons for using the lower power setting for normal hailing use, but in my opinion that general rule does not apply to emergencies for the reasons highlighted in this report.

>Given

>the length of the rescue, this was probably a good thing

The current requirements for 5W output tends to be around 1.5A in a handheld VHF radio. 1W output is around .7A and 2 W is often around 1A. while receiving takes about .3A. Typically a battery in great shape and fully charged is around 1.8A/hrs. Note that running low power gives you a fair amount of additional transmit time, but not as much as you might assume. More importantly, if your signals are not easily understandable ("solid copy"), then numerous repeats are likely and any benefit of using lower power is quickly lost. In fact, you might use up more of the battery on low power for that reason.

Good communication is likely to be difficult in bad conditions and for that reason I believe it is best to use high power to establish and then go down if copy can be maintained. The opposite of the standard rule. Poor copy leads to the receiving party making inferences from what they hear which can lead to problems. As in search box bigger than necessary, search box in wrong location, errors on status and situation. All of which may delay or hinder rescue. One can argue it is better to use available battery power early on to get critical info accurately conveyed than saving the battery for a longer duration. Margins.

Unless people are getting "roger" in response to their transmission they should ask if they were copied. I know that is very hard thing to focus on when it hits the fan, but it is important. Without some effort to verify messages are heard, lots of time and effort and battery life can be expended for no good reason and a bad situation made worse, but this may well be impractical in some circumstances. The level of frustration and the errors that arise when reception is garbled is difficult to appreciate until you have tried to communicate under weak signal conditions.

The fact the battery went down in two hours could be the result of many factors, but it does highlight the fact that NiCad bateries have many characteristics which make them less desireable than Li-Ion batteries for this application. I would attempt to find an Li-Ion replacement battery for any marine handheld unit equipped with a NiCad battery.

As important as a radio can be in these cases, it is important to keep in mind that coverage is rather limited with a handheld unit just a foot or so out of the water. It might be informative to run some tests to develop objective data on this in real world conditions. Very sobering that calls were being made on 16 and apparently no other vessels responded or relayed messages even though it was hardly a remote location.

Ed Lawson

[djlewis]

> Very sobering that calls were being made on 16 and apparently no other

> vessels responded or relayed messages even though it was hardly a remote location.

Is it possible that there were no other boats out within range? Those were pretty extreme conditions -- not much pleasure in pleasure boating that day -- and pleasure boats are what I've seen moored and underway in PI Sound.

In fact, that phenomenon should really be cited as an extra risk factor when going out in tough conditions, especially those that produce small craft warnings. There are less likely to be boats around to help in the -- even more likely -- event that you will need them. It's a perfect storm of a sort.

--David.

[bob budd]

Brian is, as usual, correct.

See http://www.batteryuniversity.com/partone-5.htm for some info on Lithium Ion. Lithium indeed is superior to both NiCad and NiMH except perhaps for "service life", which is how many years you can expect the battery to operate.

All of these chemistries contain nasty chemicals.

NiMH has greater capacity versus NiCd at the expense of greater self discharge and shorter service life. If using NiMH it is recommended that you keep the battery in the charger when not in use (at home). Otherwise, you might find yourself without a radio on game day or to a lesser degree battery life may appear unexpectedly brief.

In case it comes up in polite conversation NiCad and NiMH batteries do not have "memory effect" unless operated under tightly controlled conditions unlikely for common usage. With NiCad and NiMH fully discharging the battery is often employed to avoid this, anyway. Many chargers have a discharge function.